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A Snake Eating Its Own Tail:  The Self-Defeating 
Nature of an Overly Broad Implementation of Section 
1071 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Small businesses are the backbone of their communities.1  These 
businesses are vital in fueling economic growth and fostering community 
development.2  They are the primary source of income for many owners 
and employees.3  Their successes and failures send ripple effects though 
their economies.4 
For small businesses to succeed, they need reliable access to 
credit.5  Community banks have “consistently served as a dedicated and 
essential source of credit to small firms” 6 and have proven to be the best 
and most reliable source of credit to these small businesses.7  When 
community banks suffer, so do small businesses and the communities 
 
 1. Gregg Fairbrothers & Catalina Gorla, Social Value and Core Value: Small Businesses 
and Local Communities, FORBES (July 5, 2012, 11:57 PM), https://www.forbes.com/site 
s/greggfairbrothers/2012/07/05/social-value-and-corevalue-small-businesses-and-local-
communities/#20ab0bb3424e. 
 2. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, KEY DIMENSIONS OF THE SMALL BUSINESS 
LENDING LANDSCAPE 3 (May 2017), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/2017 
05_cfpb_Key-Dimensions-Small-Business-Lending-Landscape.pdf (“Small businesses play 
a key role in fostering community development and fueling economic growth both nationally 
and in their local communities.”). 
 3. See id. (“64 percent of respondents stated that their small business was their primary 
source of income.”). 
 4. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., A Two-Tiered System of Regulation is Needed to Preserve 
the Viability of Community Banks and Reduce the Risks of Megabanks, 2015 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 249, 297 (2015). 
 5. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 3 (“To contribute meaningfully 
to the U.S. economy, small businesses – and especially women-owned and minority-owned 
small businesses – need access to credit to smooth business cash flows from current operations 
and to allow entrepreneurs to take advantage of opportunities for growth.”). 
 6. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 288; See also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra 
note 2, at 24 (stating that small businesses continue to rely on traditional financial institutions, 
defined as large banks and small banks, as their primary source of financing). 
 7. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 24–25 (explaining that 46% of 
small businesses who applied for credit did so at a small community bank, 22% of small 
businesses rely on community banks as their primary source of credit, and small businesses 
are more likely to be approved for credit by a community bank than a larger bank). 
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they serve.8  The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) has 
begun the rulemaking process for Section 1071 (“Section 1071”) of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”), which could threaten community banks by imposing additional 
burdensome compliance costs related to small business lending.9 
Section 1071 amended the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(“ECOA”) to require financial institutions to compile, maintain, and 
report information concerning credit applications made by women-
owned, minority-owned, and small businesses.10  In May 2017, the CFPB 
took its first major step in the rulemaking process for Section 1071 by 
issuing a request for information (“RFI”) on the small-business lending 
marketplace.11  The RFI seeks to collect information which will help 
explore potential ways to implement Section 1071 in a balanced manner 
with a goal of providing timely data with the highest potential for 
achieving the statutory objectives of facilitating enforcement of fair 
lending laws, while minimizing burden to both the industry and CFPB.12 
The most fundamental goal of Section 1071 is to protect small 
businesses.13  An overly broad application, however, could be self-
defeating and ultimately hinder these same small businesses.14  If the 
implementation of Section 1071 imposes too heavy of a compliance cost 
burden, it may cause the community banks to fail, thereby restricting 
access to credit for small businesses—the very businesses this law was 
enacted to protect.15  In order to better achieve the regulatory goals of 
Section 1071 while not imposing undue compliance burdens on 
community banks, the CFPB should exercise its statutory exemption 
authority to exempt community banks with less than $50 million in assets. 
 
 8. See Fairbrothers & Gorla, supra note 1 (explaining that employees and their families 
depend on small businesses and that communities crumble without the revenue flows from 
these small businesses). 
 9. See Jeff Bater, CFPB Starts Inquiry of Small-Business Lending, [2017] Banking 
Daily (BNA) No. 90 (May 11, 2017) [hereinafter Bater, Inquiry]. 
 10. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1071(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(b) (2016). 
 11. Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed. Reg. 
22318 (May 10, 2017). 
 12. Id. at 22319. 
 13. See id. (stating that a goal of Section 1071 is to identify small business needs and 
opportunities). 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See infra Part IV; see also Request for Information Regarding the Small Business 
Lending Market, 82 Fed. Reg. at 22318 (explaining that a fundamental goal of Section 1071 
is to identify small business needs and opportunities). 
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This Note proceeds in six parts.  Part II describes the goals of 
Section 1071 and the issues to be addressed by the rulemaking process.16  
Part III examines the importance of small businesses to the economy.17  
Part IV explains how an overbroad implementation could cause 
community banks to exit the market and harm the small businesses that 
the rule was enacted to protect.18  Part V suggests that the smallest 
community banks be exempted from the implementation of Section 1071 
and explains how the exemption would save small community banks 
from significant new compliance costs.19  Finally, Part VI concludes by 
summarizing how an overly broad application of Section 1071 could 
harm community banks and the potential for the suggested exemption to 
mitigate those potential harms.20 
II. THE GOALS AND REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 1071 
Prior to the passage of Dodd-Frank, lenders were prohibited from 
collecting race and gender data in connection with nonmortgage 
lending.21  On July 16, 2007, three congressmen wrote a letter to the 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) to ask for a review of the 
impact of ending this prohibition.22  The letter also asked the GAO to 
assess the possible costs of requiring banks to collect and report this type 
of information and review the advantages and disadvantages to banks and 
small businesses of amending the rule.23  This was the beginning of the 
process of developing a rule that was eventually passed in Dodd-Frank in 
the form of Section 1071.24 
 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See infra Part V. 
 20. See infra Part VI. 
 21. Richard Cowden, Lawmakers Question Fed Ban on Collecting Race, Gender Data 
for NonMortgage Lending, [2007] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 137 (July 18, 2007). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.; see also, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”) § 1071, 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2 (2016) (enacting a final statute in the form of Section 
1071). 
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A. The Purposes of Section 1071 
The stated purpose of Section 1071 is “to facilitate enforcement 
of fair lending laws and enable communities, governmental entities, and 
creditors to identify business and community development needs and 
opportunities of women-owned, minority-owned, and small 
businesses.”25  The aims of Section 1071 can be summarized into two 
main goals: (1) to facilitate enforcement of fair lending laws,26 and (2) to 
compile reliable and consistent data on the small business lending market 
that can be used by a variety of decision makers to assess problems in the 
market and develop solutions.27  The goals of Section 1071 should also 
be viewed in light of the overall purposes of Dodd-Frank, which is to 
“promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to 
fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices,” among other 
things.28 
B. The Requirements of Section 1071 
Section 1071 seeks to accomplish its goals by requiring financial 
institutions to compile and maintain records of information provided by 
loan applicants regarding their status as women-owned, minority-owned, 
or a small business.29  To gather this information, in the case of any 
application for credit, a financial institution must inquire whether the 
business is a women-owned, minority-owned, or small business and 
 
 25. Dodd-Frank § 1071(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(a). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Testimony of Elizabeth Warren Before the Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (“Congress intended Section 1071 to produce reliable and 
consistent data that can be analyzed by the Bureau, other government agencies, and members 
of the public to facilitate enforcement of fair lending laws and to identify business and 
community development needs.”). 
 28. 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2016) (stating in the preamble that the purpose of Dodd-Frank is 
“[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer 
by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for 
other purposes”). 
 29. See Dodd-Frank § 1071(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(b) (explaining that Section 1071 
requires financial institutions to compile and maintain records of information provided by 
loan applicants regarding their status as a women-owned, minority-owned, or small business). 
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maintain a record of the responses.30  Although any applicant may refuse 
to provide any requested information,31 each financial institution will be 
required to compile and maintain a record of such information provided 
by applicants in a manner to be prescribed by the CFPB.32  Information 
that must be collected includes (1) the number of applications, (2) the 
purpose and amount of the credit applied for, (3) whether the application 
was approved, (4) the location of the business, (5) the gross annual 
revenue of the business, and (6) the race, sex, and ethnicity of the owners 
of the business as well as any additional data the CFPB deems 
necessary.33  The information collected must then be submitted to the 
CFPB.34  In addition, the information compiled and maintained must be 
retained for three years and made available to any member of the public 
upon request.35  Such information will also be made available to the 
public generally each year by the CFPB.36  Public dissemination of 
information will enable communities, governmental entities, creditors, 
and other interested parties to determine whether the needs and 
opportunities of the community are being met and provide evidence on 
which to pursue fair lending claims similar to how Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) data has been used for decades.37  The 
CFPB’s new leadership should continue on the path to implementing 
Section 1071 because a final rule could be crucial to furthering important 
 
 30. See id. (“Subject to the requirements of this section, in the case of any application to 
a financial institution for credit for women-owned, minority-owned, or small business, the 
financial institution shall— (1) inquire whether the business is a women-owned, minority-
owned, or small business . . . .”). 
 31. Dodd-Frank § 1071(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(c). 
 32. Dodd-Frank § 1071(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(e)(1). 
 33. See Dodd-Frank § 1071(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(e)(2) (requiring that collected 
information must be itemized to clearly show certain information such as the number of 
applications, the purpose and amount of the credit applied for, whether the application was 
approved, the location of the business, the gross annual revenue of the business, and the race, 
sex, and ethnicity of the owners of the business). 
 34. Dodd-Frank § 1071(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(f)(1). 
 35. Dodd-Frank § 1071(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(f)(2). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Dodd-Frank § 1071(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(a). 
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policy goals.38  However, to be successful in achieving those goals, the 
implementation must not be overbroad and self-defeating.39 
C. Issues to be Addressed in the Rulemaking Process 
Section 1071 leaves open several issues to be addressed by CFPB 
regulations.40  The CFPB will prescribe rules and issue guidance for 
carrying out and enforcing the statutory requirements of Section 1071 
through the rulemaking process.41  Under Section 1071, the CFPB is to 
issue regulations as to the manner in which financial institutions shall 
compile and maintain a record of the information received from loan 
applicants.42  The CFPB is also responsible for determining whether there 
is any additional information that would be helpful in fulfilling the 
purposes of Section 1071, implementing regulations requiring such 
information to be collected, and issuing guidance to facilitate compliance 
with the rule. 43  Perhaps the most significant issue to be addressed in the 
rulemaking process is whether the CFPB will exercise its authority to 
allow exceptions to or exemptions from Section 1071.44  Congress has 
given the CFPB the authority to adopt exceptions to any requirement and 
may exempt any financial institution or class of financial institutions from 
the requirements if it deems such exemptions necessary or appropriate.45 
 
 38. See Dodd-Frank § 1071, 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2 (explaining that the goals of Section 
1071 are “to  facilitate enforcement of fair lending laws and enable communities, 
governmental entities, and creditors to identify business and community development needs 
and opportunities of women-owned, minority-owned, and small businesses” and that it seeks 
to accomplish these goals by requiring financial institutions to compile and maintain records 
of information provided by loan applicants regarding their status as a women-owned, 
minority-owned, or small business). 
 39. See infra Part IV (explaining how an overbroad implementation of Section 1071 
could be self-defeating). 
 40. See Dodd-Frank § 1071(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(g)(1) (“The Bureau shall 
prescribe such rules and issue such guidance as may be necessary to carry out, enforce, and 
compile data pursuant to this section.”); See infra Part V (discussing why the CFPB should 
use its exemption authority to exempt certain community banks from the requirements of 
Section 1071). 
 41. See Dodd-Frank § 1071(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(g)(1) (“The Bureau shall 
prescribe such rules and issue such guidance as may be necessary to carry out, enforce, and 
compile data pursuant to this section.”). 
 42. Dodd-Frank § 1071(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(e)(1). 
 43. Dodd-Frank § 1071(e)(2)(H), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(e)(2)(H), (g)(3). 
 44. Dodd-Frank § 1071(g)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(g)(2). 
 45. Id. 
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The RFI also raises several issues that the CFPB seeks to address 
in its rulemaking process.46  Perhaps the most important issue to be 
addressed, and the primary focus of this Note, is the rule’s imposition of 
additional compliance costs on an already highly-regulated industry,47 
and whether the CFPB will use its exemption or exception authorities to 
lighten the burdens imposed by the rule.48  Through the RFI process, the 
CFPB is seeking information about the potential costs and complexity of 
imposing these small business data collections and reporting 
requirements.49  Some in the industry have expressed concern in response 
to the RFI that Section 1071 may become an onerous compliance burden 
that could stifle cost-cutting and other initiatives that have helped small 
businesses access capital.50 
The CFPB must also determine the appropriate definition of 
“small business” for which to apply the requirements of Section 1071.51  
Section 1071 defines “small businesses” as having “the same meaning as 
‘small business concern’ in Section 632” of the Small Business Act,52 
which authorizes the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) to set size 
standards for the definition.53  Using the North American Industry 
Classification System (“NAICS”), the SBA defines revenue-based or 
 
 46. See Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 22318, 22319 (May 10, 2017) (explaining that the CFPB is seeking answers to five main 
questions through the RFI process, regarding the definition of “small business,” which data 
points should be compiled, which financial institutions are engaged in business lending, 
access to credit and financial products offered to businesses, and privacy concerns). 
 47. See infra Part IV. 
 48. See infra Part V. 
 49. Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed. Reg. 
at 22318. 
 50. See Bater, Inquiry, supra note 9 (“Talbot told Bloomberg BNA the ETA is concerned 
that the effort to collect data ‘could morph into onerous, premature restrictions that 
unnecessarily stifle cost-cutting and time saving innovations that have helped small 
businesses access capital.”); see also Comment letter from Lilly Thomas, Senior Vice 
President, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of America, to Monica Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec’y, 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=CFPB-2017-0011-0547 (urging the CFPB to provide relief from the potential 
compliance costs of Section 1071 in the form of an exemption for community banks). 
 51. See Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed. 
Reg. at 22319 (explaining that the CFPB is seeking input regarding the appropriate definition 
of “small business”). 
 52. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1071(h)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(h)(2) (2016). 
 53. Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed. Reg. 
at 22319. 
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employee-based size standards for each industry.54  For its employee-
based size standard, businesses in most industries with fewer than 500 
employees are considered small businesses, with other industries having 
different thresholds.55  For its revenue-based size standard, the cutoff for 
small businesses is typically around $7.5 million in average annual 
receipts, with that number varying based on industry.56  Through the 
rulemaking process, however, the CFPB is exploring alternative 
definitions of “small business” tailored to the needs and goals of Section 
1071.57 
Another important issue to be addressed by the CFPB is how the 
information collected pursuant to Section 1071 will be used.58  
Considering the stated purpose of Section 1071—”to facilitate 
enforcement of fair lending laws”59—some financial institutions believe 
the Bureau may use the data collected to pursue fair lending enforcement 
cases.60  The other stated purpose—to “enable communities, 
governmental entities, and creditors to identify business and community 
development needs and opportunities of women-owned, minority-owned, 
and small businesses”—suggests that the data may primarily be for the 
use of other entities to diagnose problems and assess opportunities in the 
market.61  Experts have noted that the main benefit of collecting this data 
would be to fill a gap where there is a lack of information about access to 
credit for small businesses, and women-owned and minority-owned 
businesses in particular.62 
 
 54. 13 C.F.R. § 21.201 (2017); U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., TABLE OF SMALL BUSINESS SIZE 
STANDARDS 1 (2004), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_Standards_Table.pd 
f; see CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 5–6 (explaining the SBA’s system for 
small business classification). 
 55. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 6. 
 56. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 9. 
 57. Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed. Reg. 
at 22319. 
 58. See Victoria Finkle, CFPB Turns Attention to Small Business Lending Market, [2016] 
Banking Daily (BNA) No. 119 (Jun. 21, 2016) (“For traditional banks and online lenders, 
questions remain about what regulators intend to do with the information they ultimately 
gather.”). 
 59. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1071(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(a) (2016). 
 60. See Finkle, supra note 58 (“Financial institutions are already bracing for the 
possibility of fair lending enforcement cases, and some worry that the agency could explore 
additional ways to oversee business lending activities.”). 
 61. Dodd-Frank § 1071(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2(a). 
 62. Finkle, supra note 58. 
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III. THE SMALL BUSINESSES LENDING MARKET AND ITS IMPORTANCE 
TO THE ECONOMY 
Small businesses play a key role in community development and 
economic growth in their local economies and, in the aggregate, affect 
the national economy.63  Women-owned and minority-owned businesses 
are a significant component of the small business world, with 97.7% of 
all minority-owned businesses and 98.3% of all minority-owned 
businesses falling under the SBA revenue-based size standard definition 
of “small business.”64  They are critical to an innovative and dynamic 
economy.65  Firms with fewer than 500 employees have created two out 
of every three jobs since 1993 and provide work for almost half of all 
employees.66  Studies indicate that businesses with fewer than ten 
employees that had access to credit were three times more likely to create 
jobs than those with ten or more employees.67  Areas with high 
percentages of their workforce employed by small businesses show 
positive trends in local incomes, employment rates, and poverty rates.68  
When small businesses are in decline, local economies struggle, local 
government revenue declines, and unemployment rises.69  These declines 
are more likely to occur in environments where small businesses have 
difficulty accessing credit.70   
 
 63. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 3 (“Small businesses play a key 
role in fostering community development and fueling economic growth both nationally and 
in their local communities.”). 
 64. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 9. 
 65. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 10 (“Small businesses are critical 
to an innovative and dynamic economy, no matter how they are defined.”). 
 66. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 10–11 (“Small businesses, when 
defined as having fewer than 500 employees, provide work for almost half of all employees 
in the private sector. Estimates suggest these businesses have created two out of every three 
jobs since 1993.”). 
 67. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 17. 
 68. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 11. 
 69. See Fairbrothers & Gorla, supra note 1 (“When small to mid-sized businesses shut 
down, the losses to the economy, especially the local economy, can be lasting and profound 
. . . [e]mployees may experience prolonged unemployment and costly relocation, and local 
economies and local government revenues can be severely affected.”). 
 70. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 3 (“To contribute meaningfully 
to the U.S. economy, small businesses – and especially women-owned and minority-owned 
small businesses – need access to credit to smooth business cash flows from current operations 
and to allow entrepreneurs to take advantage of opportunities for growth.”). 
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The small business lending market is comprised of a few main 
types of financial institutions offering various financial products.71  The 
vast majority of loans to small businesses originate from traditional 
financial institutions, including community banks, and to a lesser extent, 
credit unions and alternative lenders.72  Community banks have long been 
the most reliable provider of credit for small businesses even in times of 
banking crises.73  The most common financial products offered to small 
businesses are lines of credit, term loans, and business credit cards in 
addition to other forms such as trade credit provided by retailers or 
wholesalers, factoring, and advances for future receipts.74 
Many small businesses have faced difficulty obtaining credit 
since the financial crisis.75  Access to credit is vital for small businesses 
not only to grow, but also to ensure smooth cash flow for current 
operations.76  A SBA study shows a strong correlation between small 
businesses’ ability to access credit and their ability to hire, finding that 
the inability to secure financing may have led to 16% of small businesses 
to reduce their number of employees and 10% to reduce employee 
benefits.77  According to the same study, another 10% of small businesses 
were unable to increase store inventory to meet existing demand due to 
their inability to access credit.78 
  
 
 71. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 25–26 (explaining that the small 
business lending market is mostly made up of traditional financial institutions, credit unions, 
and alternative lenders). 
 72. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 25–26 (explaining that 11% of 
employer firms and 13% of non-employer firms sought credit from credit unions, with 46% 
of employer firms and 33% of non-employer firms being approved, and that 21% of employer 
firms and 28% of non-employer firms sought credit from alternative lenders, with 62% and 
45% being approved, respectively). 
 73. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 292 (2015) (“In keeping with their business 
strategy of building strong relationships, community banks proved to be more reliable sources 
of credit for small businesses during the last two banking crises, compared with larger 
banks.”). 
 74. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 19–20. 
 75. Testimony of Dan Sokolov Before the Subcomm. on Investigations, Oversight, and 
Regs. of the H.  Comm. on Small Bus., 112th Cong. (2011). 
 76. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 17 (“Access to financing is vitally 
important in allowing businesses to grow.  For small businesses financing not only provides 
resources to smooth business cash flows for current operations, but also affords business 
owners the opportunity to invest in business growth.”). 
 77. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 17. 
 78. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 17. 
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IV. THE IMPACT OF AN OVERBROAD IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 
1071 
A. The Importance of Community Banks to the Economy and Small 
Businesses in Particular 
Community banks play a crucial role in their local economies, 
especially for small businesses in the community.79  Small businesses’ 
unique financing needs often can only be met by community banks, 
which employ methods80 that take soft information—information that is 
not generally available and is difficult to quantify—into consideration.81  
In contrast, larger financial institutions use traditional banking models 
that are based exclusively on hard data, which limits their ability to meet 
small business financing needs.82  Community banks’ vitality to small 
business lending markets83 enables these small businesses to contribute 
to community development and local economic growth.84  In addition to 
small businesses, community banks also play a crucial role in providing 
credit for local commercial real estate and agriculture interests.85  
Community banks are particularly important in rural areas, where, in 
some instances, they are the only banking office in the county, and 
without which more than one-third of U.S. counties would have very 
limited access to banking services.86  Community banks are able to meet 
 
 79. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 3 (“Small businesses play a key 
role in fostering community development and fueling economic growth both nationally and 
in their local communities.”). 
 80. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 289 (“Community banks pursue a “relationship 
lending” strategy that gives them significant advantages in providing credit to small firms.”). 
 81. See Tanya D. Marsh, Reforming the Regulation of Community Banks after Dodd-
Frank, 90 IND. L.J. 179, 193 (2015) (explaining that the relationship-banking model builds 
on longstanding customer relationships that give the banks richer access to “soft information” 
about their customers). 
 82. See id. at 193 (explaining that in transactional banking hard information drives 
performance and quantitative information like credit scores are used to make underwriting 
decisions). 
 83. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 289 (stating that the community banking sector 
has consistently served as a dedicated and essential source of credit to small firms). 
 84. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 3 (“Small businesses play a key 
role in fostering community development and fueling economic growth both nationally and 
in their local communities.”). 
 85. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 197 (“Community banks are absolutely vital to the 
economic health of rural America and to the agricultural economy.”). 
 86. See Wilmarth, supra note 4, at 290 (“[M]ore than one-third of U.S. counties, with a 
total population of over 16 million people, ‘would have very limited physical access to 
mainstream banking services without the presence of community banks.’”) (quoting 
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their clients’ needs in a more flexible manner87 and provide credit to some 
borrowers who could not obtain financing from other sources.88 
The most important provider of financing for small businesses 
has historically been the banking industry, within which community 
banks have “consistently served as a dedicated and essential source of 
credit to small firms.”89  Currently, community banks provide about half 
of all bank credit extended to small businesses, despite the fact that 
community banks hold less than one-fifth of all banking industry assets.90  
Community banks target small businesses as their primary customers, in 
contrast to large banks, which seek out midsized and large companies.91 
Community banks are often the best source of financing for small 
businesses.92  The 2015 and 2016 Federal Reserve Small Business Credit 
Surveys found that 46% of surveyed small businesses that applied for 
credit did so at community banks.93  According to the Pepperdine Private 
Capital Index, a 2016 survey of 1,888 small businesses, 22% of 
businesses with revenues of less than $5 million that sought credit listed 
community banks as their primary source of credit.94  The Federal 
 
Benjamin R. Backup, Community Bank Developments in 2012, 7 FDIC Q., No. 4 at 34 (2013), 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2013-vol7-4/fdic-quarterly-vol7no4.pdf). 
 87. See Hester Pierce et al., Ian Robinson & Thomas Stratmann, How are Small Banks 
Faring Under Dodd-Frank? 14 (George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 14-05, 2014), 
https://www.mercatus.org/publication/how-are-small-banks-faring-under-dodd-frank 
(explaining that community bankers believe that the relationship-banking model of banking 
is inconsistent with Dodd-Frank, because the law favors the standardized lending criteria often 
employed by larger banks and contains regulations that encourage or insist on standardization 
of bank products and services). 
 88. See Tim Critchfield et al., Community Banks: Their Recent Past, Current 
Performance, and Future Prospects, 16 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 4 (2004), https://www.fdic. 
gov/bank/analytical/banking/2005jan/br16n34full.pdf (explaining that community banks are 
often able to successfully lend to informationally opaque borrowers that have trouble 
obtaining credit from large banks because they do not have long credit histories suitable for 
credit-scoring or other model-based lending practiced by large banks). 
 89. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 288; See also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra 
note 2, at 24 (stating that small businesses continue to rely on traditional financial institutions, 
defined as large banks and small banks, as their primary source of financing). 
 90. JEFFREY W. GUNTHER & KELLY KLEMME, FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., 2012 
ANNUAL REPORT: A LENDER FOR TOUGH TIMES (2012) http://www.dallasfed.org/microsites/
fed/annual/2012/documents/ar12.pdf (finding that banks with under $10 billion “held 17 
percent of industrywide banking assets as of June 2012—but they accounted for more than 
half of the amount lent to small businesses.”). 
 91. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 291. 
 92. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 24 (explaining that small businesses 
are more likely to be able to obtain financing from community banks than large banks). 
 93. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 24. 
 94. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 25. 
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Reserve Survey also found that employer small businesses—those with 
at least one employee—and non-employer small businesses—those with 
no employees—that applied for credit were 13% and 20% more likely to 
be approved for financing from a small bank than from a large bank, 
respectively.95  These findings highlight a key advantage community 
banks provide to small businesses—they will often provide credit to small 
businesses that cannot obtain credit from large banks or other 
intermediaries.96   
Community banks can also be the most reliable source of credit 
for small businesses.97  During the financial crisis, larger banks 
drastically decreased their lending to small businesses, whereas 
community banks increased their share of the small business lending 
market, despite their declining share of total banking industry assets in 
the same time period.98  Community banks also outpaced large banks in 
small business lending growth during the recovery.99   
The advantages provided by community banks in small-business 
lending are primarily due to their use of “relationship banking,” rather 
than the transactional banking strategy employed by large banks.100  By 
engaging in a “relationship banking” strategy, community banks are able 
to meet their clients’ needs in a more flexible manner and provide credit 
to some borrowers who could not obtain financing from other sources.101  
Transactional banking involves highly standardized products and relies 
 
 95. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 25 (“Of those that applied, 67 
percent of employer small businesses and 52 percent of non-employer businesses were 
approved for financing from a small bank, while larger banks only approved 54 percent of 
employer small businesses and 32 percent of non-employer small businesses that applied for 
credit.”). 
 96. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2 (finding that small businesses were 
more likely to be approved for financing by a small bank than a large bank). 
 97. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 292 (“In keeping with their business strategy of 
building strong relationships, community banks proved to be more reliable sources of credit 
for small businesses during the last two banking crises, compared with larger banks.”). 
 98. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 292 (explaining that during the most recent crisis, 
larger banks cut back sharply on their small business lending, while community banks slightly 
increased their share of the small business lending market between mid-2008 and mid-2012, 
even though their share of total banking industry assets declined during that period). 
 99. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 293 (“Moreover, small business lending grew at a 
significantly faster rate at community banks during 2013 and 2014, compared with the rest of 
the banking industry.”). 
 100. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 289 (“Community banks pursue a “relationship 
lending” strategy that gives them significant advantages in providing credit to small firms.”). 
 101. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2 (finding that small businesses were 
more likely to be approved for financing by a small bank than a large bank). 
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on “hard data” such as credit scores to make underwriting decisions.102  
Relationship banking, on the other hand, depends on longstanding 
relationships with customers that give banks richer access to “soft 
information” about their customers that cannot be easily quantified.103  
Community banks utilize this soft information to afford their employees 
more discretion in making lending decisions104 in ways that better serve 
many borrowers than with a purely quantitative strategy.105   
Community banks can offer more personalized services to their 
customers due to their longstanding business and personal 
relationships.106  Community bank managers generally have long tenures 
and are often deeply involved in their communities, so they have superior 
ability to assess and monitor local firms.107  Relationship banking can be 
very beneficial to small businesses, because many such firms are 
“informationally opaque,” meaning they do not have long credit histories 
suitable for credit scoring or other model-based lending practiced by large 
banks, and community banks can overcome this challenge by utilizing 
soft information.108  Utilization of relationship banking strategies awards 
community banks with a degree of flexibility not available to large banks, 
which rely on highly-standardized transactional banking strategies.109  
 
 102. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 193 (explaining that “in transactional banking hard 
information drives performance” and quantitative information like credit scores are used to 
make underwriting decisions). 
 103. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 193 (explaining that the relationship-banking model 
builds on longstanding customer relationships that give the banks richer access to “soft 
information” about their customers). 
 104. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 193 (“Computer models may be used to enhance 
underwriting, but more authority is given to community bank employees to make lending 
decisions.”). 
 105. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 193 (“[S]tudies have shown that many borrowers, 
particularly small businesses, farmers, and individuals, are better served by relationship 
banking than by the transactional-banking model.”). 
 106. Adam R. Lewis, Note, North Carolina Community Banks: Survival Strategies for 
Turbulent Times, 17 N.C. BANKING INST. 333, 353 (2013) (“Community banks know their 
customers well and are able to offer more 
personalized service and advice.”). 
 107. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 289 (“Community banks have a superior ability to 
assess and monitor local firms because their managers and loan officers generally have long 
tenures in their positions and are deeply involved in the life of their communities.”). 
 108. See Critchfield et al., supra note 88, at 4 (explaining that the strength of community 
banks stems from their ability to successfully lend to “informationally opaque” borrowers that 
have trouble obtaining credit from large banks because they do not have “long credit histories 
suitable for credit-scoring or other model-based lending practiced by large banks . . . .”). 
 109. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 347 (“[B]ig banks provide credit to small 
businesses primarily through standardized, ‘cookie cutter’ loan programs, including business 
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Unfortunately, community bankers feel that certain parts of Dodd-Frank, 
including Section 1071, threaten the relationship banking model, thus 
harming borrowers like small businesses that depend on relationship 
banking.110 
B. Compliance Costs and Competitive Environment 
The compliance costs associated with Section 1071 could prove 
to be too burdensome for community banks and force them to exit the 
market by limiting their access to credit, which would be very harmful to 
women-owned, minority-owned, and small businesses that the rule was 
enacted to protect.111  About half of small businesses turn to community 
banks to apply for credit, where they were 13% to 20% more likely to be 
approved, and 22% of these small businesses depend on community 
banks as their primary source of credit.112  Also, these small businesses 
would be left without access to the same quality of banking that 
community banks have historically provided through the process of 
relationship banking,113 and in some cases would be left without access 
to credit at all.114  Even for community banks that would not fail, they 
may not be able to practice relationship banking to the same level as 
before due to the standardized nature of Section 1071’s requirements.115 
 
credit cards and equipment leases, which (1) rely on impersonal credit-scoring techniques and 
other automated technologies and (2) enable many of the resulting loans to be securitized.”). 
 110. See Pierce et al., supra note 87, at 14 (explaining that community bankers believe 
that the relationship-banking model of banking is inconsistent with Dodd-Frank). 
 111. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 345 (explaining that community banks face compliance 
cost threats and a great number of banks with between $100 million and $250 million in assets 
have failed in recent years). 
 112. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 25 (“Of those that applied, 67 
percent of employer small businesses and 52 percent of non-employer businesses were 
approved for financing from a small bank, while larger banks only approved 54 percent of 
employer small businesses and 32 percent of non-employer small businesses that applied for 
credit.  According to the Pepperdine Index, a comparable small bank statistic suggests about 
22 percent of surveyed businesses with revenues less than $5 million that sought credit listed 
community banks as their primary source of credit.”). 
 113. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 193 (“[S]tudies have shown that many borrowers, 
particularly small businesses, farmers, and individuals, are better served by relationship 
banking than by the transactional-banking model.”). 
 114. See Critchfield et al., supra note 88, at 4 (explaining that community banks have 
unique abilities to successfully lend to borrowers that have trouble obtaining credit from large 
banks). 
 115. See Pierce et al., supra note 87, at 14 (explaining that community bankers believe 
that the relationship-banking model of banking is inconsistent with Dodd-Frank, because the 
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In order to understand the impact of legislation like Section 1071 
on community banks, it is necessary to understand the current economic 
environment in which they operate.  Two important factors in the 
community bank market are competitive pressures presented by large 
banks and compliance costs presented by recent legislation and 
regulation.116  These competitive pressures and burdensome compliance 
costs are contributing factors to the trend of many community banks 
failing, merging together to reduce costs and achieve a certain scale, or 
being acquired by larger financial institutions.117  This trend is shrinking 
the market and leading some in the industry to predict that community 
banks will eventually disappear entirely.118 
Competitive pressure in the lending marketplace disrupts the 
economic viability of community banks.119  Various statutes passed in the 
1990s120 deregulated the banking industry and contributed to a trend of 
consolidation.121  This resulted in a large concentration of power and 
assets in a few big banks, which created significant competitive problems 
for community banks.122  Today, the six largest bank holding companies 
in America hold 67% of all bank holding company assets.123  As the 
 
law favors the standardized lending criteria often employed by larger banks and contains 
regulations that encourage or insist on standardization of bank products and services). 
 116. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 225 (discussing the competitive disadvantages faced by 
community banks and how they will be further exacerbated by new compliance costs). 
 117. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 346–51 (discussing recent community bank failures, 
acquisitions, and mergers). 
 118. See Anthony Gaeta, Jr., The Future of Community Banking, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 
1, 1 (2016) (“In my conclusion, I stated that ‘so alas, I see the demise and eventual 
extinguishment of true small town community banks.’”). 
 119. See Marsh, supra note 81, at 225 (discussing the competitive disadvantages faced by 
community banks and how they will be further exacerbated by new compliance costs). 
 120. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 336–37 (explaining that Riegle-Neal, by lifting the 
Bank Holding Company Act’s prohibition on interstate banking, allowed large banks to 
establish branches in other states, significantly increasing the number of potential competitors 
for community banks; then further explaining how community banks’ competitive problems 
were exacerbated by the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which repealed Glass-
Steagall and allowed bank holding companies to grow larger through acquisition of 
companies engaged in financial in nature activities, further increasing competition to 
community banks and endangering them). 
 121. See Lewis, supra note 106 at 336–37 (describing how Congress passed a number of 
laws in the 1990s that deregulated the banking industry and opened the door for large financial 
institutions to grow even larger and to compete directly with community banks). 
 122. See Brynne Krause, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act: How Increased Regulation Has Given Large Banks an Artificial Competitive Edge, 83 
UMKC L. REV. 1045, 1048 (2015) (stating that the six largest banks in America hold 67% of 
all banking industry assets). 
 123. Id. 
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biggest financial institutions merge to become even larger, they are able 
to absorb new costs such as compliance costs more easily than smaller 
banks, making it harder for community banks to compete.124  During the 
2008 financial crisis, many of these larger banks received government 
assistance, while some smaller banks were allowed to fail.125  This created 
a perception that large banks are safer because of government backing in 
times of crisis, causing consumers to flee the smaller banks that may not 
receive such assistance.126   
In addition to competitive pressures, community banks have 
faced growing compliance costs over the past two decades that some 
banks have found to be too much of a burden to continue operating.127  
After already struggling to comply with previous enactments,128 
community banks were hit with the largest imposition of compliance 
costs that they had ever faced in the form of Dodd-Frank.129  Critics agree 
that these new significant compliance costs place community banks at a 
further competitive disadvantage.130  A George Mason University survey 
found that community banks that responded have had increased 
compliance costs since Dodd-Frank was passed, with many respondents 
reporting that they would have to hire one to two additional employees to 
meet the statutory requirements.131  In response to a survey conducted by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas, 84% of community banks reported 
 
 124. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 342 (explaining that larger banking entities may have 
a compliance department or in-house counsel in addition to at least one law firm on retainer, 
enabling them to better adapt to compliance costs, but community banks usually lack such 
resources). 
 125. Lewis, supra note 106, at 342. 
 126. Lewis, supra note 106, at 342. 
 127. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 345 (explaining that community banks face compliance 
cost threats and a great number of banks with between $100 million and $250 million in assets 
have failed in recent years). 
 128. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) was the first major compliance hurdle 
faced by community banks in recent years, passed in response to the failure of Enron and 
related scandals in the early 2000s, SOX imposed new reporting requirements that placed a 
tremendous and disproportionate burden on publicly held community banks, decreasing 
profitability and their ability to compete. Sarbanes-Oxley Essential Information, SOX-
ONLINE, http://www.sox-online.com/sarbanes-oxley-basics/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2018); 
Lewis, supra note 106, at 337–38. 
 129. See Regina F. Burch, Financial Regulatory Reform Post-Financial Crisis: 
Unintended Consequences for Small Businesses, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 409, 413 (2012) 
(stating that Dodd-Frank is “the most sweeping financial industry reform legislation since the 
Great Depression”). 
 130. Marsh, supra note 81, at 226. 
 131. Pierce et al., supra note 87, at 34. 
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that compliance requirements were the most significant challenge they 
faced.132  Whereas larger banks tend to have compliance departments or 
in-house counsel to work on these compliance requirements, community 
banks usually lack such resources, increasing the difficulty of adapting to 
new regulations.133  “Outsourcing much of this regulatory burden is 
expensive and self-staffing by the community banks is even more 
impractical from an expense standpoint.”134 
The competitive pressures and compliance costs currently faced 
by community banks have led to a trend of consolidation and bank 
failures.135  According to the same George Mason University study, the 
number of community banks has shrunk 14% since Dodd-Frank was 
passed, and 27% since 2000.136  Since 2008, 555 banks have failed, a 
great number of which were banks with between $100 million and $250 
million in assets.137  In North Carolina alone, Waccamaw Bank, Blue 
Ridge Savings Bank, The Bank of Asheville, Cooperative Bank, and 
Cape Fear Bank have all failed in recent years.138  Some reports, however, 
express doubts as to whether Dodd-Frank is the main cause of this 
consolidation.139 
In the face of potential failure, community banks have a few 
options.140  Specifically, they can merge with other community banks or 
seek to be acquired by another institution.141  Currently, bank holding 
 
 132. FED. RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CITY DIV. OF SUPERVISION AND RISK MGMT., SURVEY 
OF COMMUNITY DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 1, 4 (August 2011), https://www.kansascityfed.o 
rg/publicat/banking/surveycommbanks/11BankResults.pdf. 
 133. Lewis, supra note 106, at 342. 
 134. Gaeta, Jr., supra note 118, at 4. 
 135. Marsh, supra note 81, at 185. 
 136. Hester Pierce & Stephen Matteo Miller, Small Banks By the Numbers, 2000-2014, 
MERCATUS CENTER (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.mercatus.org/publication/small-banks-
numbers-2000-2014. 
 137. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FAILED BANK LIST, http://fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/
banklist.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2018) (covering bank failures between Jan. 1, 2000 and Jan. 
3, 2018). 
 138. List of Failed Banks 2009–2017, BANKRATE (Jan. 10, 2017), http://
www.bankrate.com/finance/banking/failed-banks-north-carolina.aspx. 
 139. Deena Zaidi, Is Dodd-Frank Really Killing Community Banks?, THESTREET (Nov. 3, 
2015, 12:17 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13348453/1/is-dodd-frank-really-killing-
community-banks.html; See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE WHITE HOUSE, THE 
PERFORMANCE OF COMMUNITY BANKS OVER TIME 1, 3 (2016), available at https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/
20160810_cea_community_banks.pdf (Aug. 2016) (explaining that bank consolidation is a 
long-running trend that has been occurring since long before the passage of Dodd-Frank). 
 140. Lewis, supra note 106, at 346–49. 
 141. Lewis, supra note 106, at 346–49. 
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companies are reluctant to acquire community banks in a market that is 
saturated with banks with assets in the billions.142  The recent success of 
community bank mergers suggests that merging may be the best option 
for struggling community banks.143  The bottom line is that the bigger the 
entity, the more likely it is that it can absorb increased compliance 
costs.144  The data from 2011 shows that banks with under $250 million 
in assets failed at three times the rate of those over that threshold.145  It 
seems clear that in the current environment, struggling community banks 
either merge or are acquired, while some fail, all of which decrease the 
number of community banks in the market, disproportionately affecting 
small businesses.146 
C. The Impact of Community Banks Exiting the Small Business 
Lending Market 
The number of community banks has decreased over recent years 
due to competitive pressures and compliance costs, and will continue to 
do so as more compliance costs are imposed on these already-struggling 
institutions.147  A 2013 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis study 
projected that nearly “[13%] of the banks with assets less than $50 million 
would become unprofitable” when the staff is increased by one half of a 
person.148  Such staff increases have come to fruition according to the 
George Mason University study, which found that the median compliance 
staff of the banks surveyed have already had to hire an additional 
employee because of Dodd-Frank.149  Thus, it would not be surprising if 
these banks had to hire more employees as the remainder of Dodd-
 
 142. Lewis, supra note 106, at 346. 
 143. Lewis, supra note 106, at 334. 
 144. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 342 (explaining that, whereas larger banks tend to have 
compliance departments or in-house counsel to combat compliance costs, community banks 
usually lack such resources, making it more difficult to adapt to new regulations). 
 145. Bank Failures in Brief, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
historical/bank/2011/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
 146. Lewis, supra note 106, at 346–49. 
 147. Lewis, supra note 106, at 346–49. 
 148. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, QUANTIFYING THE COSTS OF ADDITIONAL 
REGULATION ON COMMUNITY BANKS 1, 6 (2013). 
 149. See Pierce et al., supra note 87 (“The median number of compliance staff for the 
banks in our survey increased from one to two, and more than a quarter of respondents plan 
to add another compliance person.”). 
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Frank—including Section 1071—is implemented, possibly making them 
unprofitable.150 
The recent community bank failures have inflicted serious harm 
on small businesses and communities.151  Prominent economists have 
observed that the community bank failures have had a disproportionate 
impact on small businesses.152  Similar bank failures “between 2008 and 
2010 had significant adverse impacts on income, employment, 
compensation growth, and poverty in the counties where the failures 
occurred.”153  Through relationship banking, community banks are able 
to provide credit to some small businesses that cannot obtain affordable 
credit elsewhere.154  This was apparent in some areas where “many small 
businesses could not find any type of external funding—or were forced 
to rely on much more expensive credit from nonbank lenders” because 
local community banks failed or were unable to continue providing loans 
to their established small firm customers.155 
A further decline in community banks would threaten small 
businesses, consumers, and local communities.156  There is a well-
established link between small businesses and community banks, 
explaining why small firms, consumers, and local communities suffer 
when community banks do not have a competitive presence in local 
markets.157  The main impact of community bank failures on communities 
will be the decreased availability of funding for small businesses.158  
Thus, the declining role of community banks as providers of credit, which 
reflects the consolidation of the banking system, is probably a significant 
factor in the downtrend in the share of credit provided to small 
 
 150. See Pierce et al., supra note 87, at 35 (showing that compliance burdens of Dodd-
Frank force small banks to hire additional employees). 
 151. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 294. 
 152. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 294 (statement of Mark Gentler) (“The demise of 
local lenders has inflicted a disproportionate blow on small enterprises.”) (statement of Mark 
Zandi) (“Small bank failures matter a lot to the communities in which they operate, especially 
in non-urban areas. Small banks are key to small businesses.”). 
 153. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 294. 
 154. See Critchfield et al., supra note 88, at 4 (explaining that the strength of community 
banks stems from their ability to utilize a relationship banking model to successfully lend to 
“informationally opaque” borrowers). 
 155. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 295. 
 156. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 298. 
 157. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 298. 
 158. Lewis, supra note 106, at 354. 
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businesses.159  A recent study found that small businesses “were less 
likely to obtain credit from banks” and “were likely to receive lower 
amounts of credit” in markets dominated by the largest banks.160  These 
large banks also charge substantially higher fees on deposit account 
services compared to community banks, which probably contributes to 
community banks’ much higher rates of customer satisfaction and a 
higher level of citizen trust.161  Small businesses suffer when community 
banks fail, and because small businesses are so vital to their communities, 
their failures can cause local economies to struggle.162 
As community banks exit the market, other entities will fill in to 
meet their customers’ banking needs, but it is doubtful whether they can 
do so as effectively as community banks.163  Small businesses would 
probably have more trouble obtaining financing with these alternative 
lenders.164  Credit unions have very conservative lending standards and 
big banks do not participate in relationship banking, so even if these small 
businesses are able to obtain credit, it almost certainly would not come 
with the same level of flexibility as provided by relationship banking.165  
Since relationship banking can sometimes be the only lending technique 
that affords informationally opaque borrowers the ability to obtain 
financing,166 “[m]any of the loans small business owners depend on to 
start new businesses, or expand existing businesses, will not be available 
if community banks disappear”  because credit unions, big banks, and 
other alternative sources of credit do not consider such factors.167 
  
 
 159. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 298. 
 160. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 298. 
 161. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 4, at 299. 
 162. Fairbrothers & Gorla, supra note 1, at X. 
 163. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 353 (“Undoubtedly, other entities will fill in to meet 
the banking needs of most general customers.”). 
 164. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 353 (“However, it may be more difficult for some 
borrowers to be approved for credit.”). 
 165. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 353 (“Credit unions, as non-profit and tax-exempt 
entities, have very conservative lending standards, and big banks are not willing to provide 
“reputational lending” to the same extent as community banks.”). 
 166. See Critchfield et al., supra note 88, at 4 (explaining that community banks are more 
able to successfully lend to “informationally opaque” borrowers that have trouble obtaining 
credit from large banks because they do not have long credit histories suitable for credit-
scoring or other model-based lending practiced by large banks). 
 167. Lewis, supra note 106, at 354. 
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V. EXEMPTING COMMUNITY BANKS WITH LESS THAN $50 MILLION IN 
ASSETS 
Those in the community banking industry have made a 
resounding plea to the CFPB to exempt community banks from the 
implementation of Section 1071.168  There is precedent for the CFPB 
exempting smaller financial institutions from reporting requirements.169  
For example, in 2013, the CFPB exempted mortgage servicers that 
service 5,000 or fewer mortgages from its new Mortgage Servicing 
Rules.170  The CFPB has also exempted small banks and credit unions 
from its payday lending rule.171  The exemption would also fit within the 
larger emerging regulatory scheme of tailoring regulations to bank 
size.172   
The CFPB should not, however, exempt all community banks, as 
overbroad exclusions could potentially render Section 1071 
ineffective.173  Since community banks occupy around half of the small 
business lending market, an outright exclusion would leave data on half 
 
 168. Comment letter from Tom Quaadman, Exec. Vice President, Ctr. for Capital Mkts. 
Competitiveness, to Monica Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec’y, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2017-0011-0630 
; Thomas, supra note 50. 
 169. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 2013 REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES 
ACT (REGULATION X) AND TRUTH IN LENDING ACT (REGULATION Z) MORTGAGE SERVICING 
FINAL RULES 14 (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_compliance-
guide_2013-mortgage-servicing-rules.pdf [hereinafter CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
REGULATION X AND REGULATION Z] (explaining the exemption for small servicers from 
certain parts of the Mortgage Servicing Rules); see also Jeff Bater, Small Banks, Credit 
Unions Win Carve-Out in CFPB Payday Rule, [2017] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 193 
(October 6, 2017) [hereinafter Bater, Carve-Out] (explaining that the CFPB’s final rule on 
payday lending will exempt lenders who make 2,500 or fewer short-term or balloon payment 
loans per year and derive less than 10% of their revenue from such loans). 
 170. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REGULATION X AND REGULATION Z, supra note 
169, at 14 (“Servicers that qualify as small servicers are exempt from certain parts of the 
Mortgage Servicing Rules.”). 
 171. See Bater, Carve-Out, supra note 169 (explaining the CFPB’s exemption for lenders 
who make 2,500 or fewer short-term or balloon payment loans per year and derive less than 
10% of their revenue from such loans from its final rule on payday lending). 
 172. See Jeanna Smialek, Yellen Says Fed Working on Tailoring Regulations to Bank Size, 
[2017] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 192 (October 5, 2017) (explaining that the Federal Reserve 
Board has been working to ensure that banking regulations are tailored to the size of the 
financial institution.). 
 173. See Request for Information Regarding the Small Business Lending Market, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 22318 (May 10, 2017) (“In order to achieve this statutory purpose, the Bureau believes 
the section 1071 data should cover an extensive share of the market and contain enough 
flexibility to analyze different market segments.”). 
   
2018] APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF SECTION 1071 129 
of the loans that Section 1071 inaccessible to the CFPB, limiting the 
effectiveness of the rule.174  Without the ability to monitor these loans, 
the CFPB cannot achieve their stated goal of facilitating enforcement of 
fair lending laws on this half of small business loans.175  It is also 
important to keep in mind that while relationship banking has many great 
advantages, it also allows a great deal of discretion, which may open the 
door for bank employees’ inherent biases to impact lending decisions—
either intentionally or unintentionally.176  Also, without the data from half 
of the small business lending market, the CFPB would have an 
incomplete data set upon which it could attempt to accomplish its stated 
goal of enabling “communities, governmental entities, and creditors to 
identify business and community development needs and opportunities 
of women-owned, minority-owned, and small businesses.”177  While it is 
not necessary to possess data for every small business loan to draw 
conclusions about the small business lending market, it certainly leads to 
more accurate decisions if at least some of the data from community bank 
loans were included.178  The National Community Reinvestment 
Coalition (“NCRC”) issued a white paper urging the CFPB to take an 
expansive approach in developing its final rule, and not to create 
exemptions that would exclude “significant numbers of financial 
institutions.”179  The NCRC fears that overbroad exclusions could 
“obfuscate or result in market distortions,” impair the ability to engage in 
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fair lending enforcement, and constrain the public’s ability to determine 
unmet needs.180 
The most effective solution is to implement a size-based 
exclusion for community banks with less than $50 million in assets—
those that need compliance relief most.181  While most size-based 
exclusions are somewhat arbitrary, such an exemption is a bright line rule 
that is easy to implement since the only information needed is the value 
of the bank’s assets, and $50 million in assets is a logical line to draw 
because it is the threshold at which banks would start to become 
unprofitable due to additional compliance costs.182  This would provide a 
more efficient process for accomplishing the stated goal of facilitating 
enforcement of fair lending laws, without imposing too heavy of a 
compliance burden on those community banks most at risk of being 
unable to meet the demands of Section 1071.183  The dataset of 
information on small business loans would still be incomplete, but the 
missing portion would not be nearly as vast with only the smallest 
community banks being excluded.184  This would enable the public to 
draw more accurate conclusions about the small business lending market 
to determine unmet needs.185  Overall, providing an exemption for 
community banks with under $50 million in assets would strike a good 
balance between limiting onerous compliance costs that could put 
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community banks in danger of failure and providing overbroad 
exclusions that could potentially render the rule ineffective.186 
A. An Exemption Would Reduce Significant Compliance Costs 
Imposed by Section 1071 
Section 1071 imposes vast new compliance costs on community 
banks and, in some cases, may even lead to their failures.187  Community 
banks already face heavy competitive pressures from larger banks, and 
imposing more heavy compliance costs places them at an even greater 
competitive disadvantage when the larger banks are more able to adapt to 
these costs.188  The need to hire even one additional person to comply 
with the law could be the death knell to a community bank.189  While the 
precise impact of implementing Section 1071 in a broad form is not yet 
clear, it is not difficult to project that a rule requiring extensive 
information gathering, recordkeeping, and reporting could force 
community banks to hire additional employees to comply with these 
requirements.190  In the RFI, the CFPB even recognized the potential for 
Section 1071 to be burdensome to community banks and stated a goal of 
minimizing its burden to both the industry and the Bureau.191 
Much of the concern stems from the heterogeneous nature of 
small business lending, which would be incompatible with collecting 
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mass data.192  A GAO report conducted prior to the enactment of Section 
1071 analyzed the potential costs of the kind of data collection required 
by Section 1071.193  The report warned that such data collection and 
reporting could impose major compliance burdens, with potential costs 
including information system integration, employee training, and 
compliance costs.194 
The costs of complying would likely be similar to those of a 
similar reporting regime that has been in place for decades under the 
HMDA.195  The HMDA requires certain depository institutions to 
disclose similar data points to those required by Section 1071, including 
the race, gender, and income level of all mortgage applicants.196  Also, 
one purpose of the HMDA—to make the data collected publicly available 
to be used to identify potentially discriminatory lending patterns and 
practices197—is similar to that of Section 1071.198  The CFPB, since the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, also has HMDA rulemaking authority.199  
In October 2015, the CFPB issued a final rule regarding the HMDA, 
which introduced sweeping changes and imposed additional compliance 
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burdens.200  With the CFPB increasing regulatory requirements, many 
institutions have had to “implement more robust compliance 
management systems,” with costs potentially impacting their ability to 
offer quality products and services.201  Due to the new HMDA 
requirements, institutions will have to consider new information 
technology challenges, compliance personnel appointments or engage 
third-party vendors, and additional privacy risks.202 
As costly as HMDA compliance has been for financial 
institutions, Section 1071 would likely be even more burdensome due to 
key differences in mortgage-lending and small business lending 
practices.203  Whereas mortgage lending can be a formulaic process, small 
business lending typically relies on more complicated standards.204  For 
small business lending, there is usually no standardized application 
process, as each small business has unique credit needs tailored to its own 
distinctive characteristics.205  Thus, current practices in the small business 
lending market would not conform to standard data collection efforts.206   
This is especially true for community banks, which, as the 
Independent Community Bankers of America (“ICBA”) highlights in its 
response to the RFI, could face a disproportionate burden of the 
mandate.207  According to the ICBA, community banks would have to 
implement an entirely new small business lending process to 
accommodate Section 1071, straying from their nuanced and unique 
process and revert to a homogeneous process that could drive small 
business credit out of small banks and reduce access to credit for small 
businesses with unique credit needs.208 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Section 1071 seeks to facilitate enforcement of fair lending laws 
and provide a means for the public to determine unmet needs in the small 
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business lending market by requiring financial institutions to compile, 
maintain, and report information concerning credit applications made by 
women-owned, minority-owned, and small businesses.209  These are very 
important goals, because of the crucial role small businesses play in our 
economy.210  However, too broad of an imposition of heavy compliance 
costs by the implementation of the rule could be self-defeating and leave 
these small businesses worse off by putting community banks at risk of 
failure, thereby restricting access to credit for those businesses.211  The 
best way to achieve the goals of Section 1071 while not imposing undue 
compliance burdens on community banks would be to provide an 
exemption from the rule’s requirements for community banks with under 
$50 million in assets.212 
 
STEPHEN MICHAEL SPIVEY* 
 
 
 209. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1071(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2 (2016). 
 210. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 3 (explaining that small 
businesses are vital in fostering community development and fueling economic growth, they 
are the primary source of income for many owners and employees, and when they are 
successful, their communities create positive trends in local incomes, employment rates, and 
poverty rates). 
 211. See supra Part IV. 
 212. See supra Part V. 
*I would like to thank my soon-to-be wife, Sydney, and my family, to whom I owe everything 
for their support and inspiration and without whom I would not be where I am today.  I would 
also like to thank Ethan Trotz, Farhayal Zubair, and Professor Lissa Broome for their 
thoughtful comments and guidance throughout the editing process. 
